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Abstract: 
 
Analyses of comparative constitutional law are frequently framed by a particular vision of 
constitutionalism that we call the ‘structural-liberal’ vision.  This vision sees the purpose of 
constitutional as being one of limiting state power – its ‘liberal’ component – which is 
done through the construction of a particular set of institutional architectures—such as 
judicial constitutional review, judicial protection and enforcement of fundamental rights,  
separation of powers, rule of law, etc. – its ‘structural component.  In this paper, we argue 
that such analyses are incomplete.  The structural-liberal vision is but one of a number of 
ways of conceptualizing constitutionalism.  It is the product of a particular time and place, 
and reflects the particular concerns and experiences of that time and place.  Conversely, 
there are other kinds of important constitutional concerns and experiences that the 
structural liberal-vision renders invisible.   These include processes of constitutional 
emergence and evolution, and symbiotic relationships between constitutionalism and 
other aspects of the regulatory environment (such as the economic structure of the state).  
In order to be complete, analyses of comparative constitutional law need to be more 
attentive to the distinctive concerns and experiences of the subjects of their attention.  
This involves allowing the subject system to speak for itself within the context of the 
larger, human discussion of constitutionalism – an analytic methodology that we call 
“constitutional reflexivity”.. 
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I. INTRODUCTION:  THE FOUNDATION OF STRUCTURAL LIBERALISM 
 
 The modern, liberal vision of constitutionalism – what we are calling structural-
liberalism – has contributed greatly to the human experience of constitutionalism and has 
come to dominate the “comparative" constitutional imagination – i.e., ‘comparative 
constitutional law’.  But, like all regulatory ideas, it is a product of particular circumstances: 
its foci reflect the concerns of time and place. These concerns and prescriptions are 
important, and are certainly not limited to the experiences of the United States, but at the 
same time, they inevitably overlook – or conceal – other concerns that can shape 
constitutionalism in other times and places. 
 This ‘structural-liberal’ vision brings together two components:  a liberal component, 
which defines the purpose of constitutionalism to be one of limiting state power;3 and a 
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structural component, which identifies a particular set of institutional devices – e.g., judicial 
review, rule of law, protection of rights, separation of powers, democratic elections – as 
necessary to achieve that purpose.4 It derives primarily from the particular constitutional 
concerns and experiences that accompanied efforts to construct a ‘United States’ 
immediately after achieving independence from the English: these include an ineffectual 
central-level government, operating in relative safety from a geo-political perspective,5 but 
facing significant internal dissatisfaction.6  The principal purpose of the resulting 
Constitution of 1789 was thus to create a strong central government capable of bringing 
internal coherence to the country.   
 In order to do that, however, it would have to reign in a budding ‘constituent power’ 
that was increasingly hostile to the conservative economic views of the (pre-) national 
political elite.7  This would require diluting the powers of then quite autonomous ‘states’ 
that would constitute the union.  Supporters of the state governments thus expressed their 
opposition to the proposed constitution by portraying the central government it created as 
an unnecessary threat to existing liberties.  Since the American state was not under even 
remote military or existential threat, the debate surrounding the ratification of the 
constitution focused on whether the central government would be internally overbearing, 
                                                                                                                                                        
3 See, e.g., Graham Maddox, ‘Constitution’, in Terence Ball, James Farr and Russell L. 
Handon (eds.), Political Innovation and Conceptual Change (Cambridge University Press, 
1989), 50-67; Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal 
Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). 
4 See, e.g., Louis Henkin, ‘A New Birth of Constitutionalism: Genetic Influences and Genetic 
Defects’, in Michael Rosenfeld (ed.), Constitutionalism, Identity, Difference, and Legitimacy 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), 39-53. 
5 Akhil Reed Amar, ‘Some New World Lessons for the Old World’, University of Chicago 
Law Review 58 (1991): 483-510. 
6 See Gordon S Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1993), 229-324. 
7 See id. at 234-270. 
 
 
3 
rather than on whether it would be effective at carrying out national policy or in resisting 
outside interference. 8   
 The newness of the post-independence state, and its democratic fragility (as 
evinced, most particularly, by Shays’ Rebellion, the direct inspiration for the drafting of the 
new constitution9), discouraged supporters of the new constitution from appealing to 
national solidarity or to constituent power as the principal device for protecting these 
liberties. In fact, as noted above, the constitution was intended in part to constrain 
constituent power, as Madison famously acknowledged in his 10th Federalist.10  Therefore 
its defenders, using the mechanical political-economic analyses invented by the Baron de 
Montesquieu to explain the success of the English constitution, focused on particularities of 
the new constitution’s institutional design that, they argued, would prevent the dangerous 
aggrandizements of political power feared by the constitution’s political opponents.11 
 And so emerged the particular foci of the structural-liberal vision – a focus on safety 
rather than efficiency (because the United States would never really be threatened by an 
outside force12); and a focus on structure rather than on constituent power (because 
constituent power was the danger that the constitution was trying to overcome13).  Over 
the succeeding two centuries, elements would be added to and subtracted from the 
structural pantheon as the United States responded to new regulatory problems – 
Tocqueville would introduce ‘democracy’ in the mid-19th century, and progressivism would 
                                                 
8 See generally Ralph Ketcham (ed.), The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional 
Debates (New York: New American Library, 1986). 
9 Michael Lienesche, ‘Reinterpreting Rebellion:  The Influence of Shays’s Rebellion on 
American Political Thought’, in ed. Robert A Gross (ed.), In Debt to Shays: The Bicentennial 
of an Agrarian Rebellion (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1993), 161-182. 
10 See generally Wood, Radicalization, 234-270. 
11 See id. at XX. 
12 See Amar, ‘Some New-World Lessons’. 
13 Wood, Radicalization, 234-270. 
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then convert democracy from a participatory to an electoral democracy towards the end of 
that century.14  The modern, positivist understanding of the ‘rule of law’15 would also 
emerge in the late 19th century as a regulatory response to national industrialization.16 At 
the same time, industrialization would also cause the pre-eminent status that the ‘right to 
property’ had enjoyed in the 19th century constitution to be considerably demoted.17  In the 
aftermath of the Second World War, the increasing pluralization of American political 
society would lead to the substitution of equality for liberty as the constitutional telos.18  
 To be sure, the American structural-liberal vision was not the only constitutionalism 
to emerge out of the revolutions of the late 18th and early 19th centuries.  Different visions 
were to emerge out of Revolutionary France,19 and Tory,20 Whiggish,21 and radical22 
England.  These visions were also addressed to their own distinct sets of problems, and 
                                                 
14 See Michael W. Dowdle, ‘Public Accountability in Alien Terrain: Exploring for 
Constitutional Accountability in the People’s Republic of China’, in Michael W. Dowdle 
(ed.), Public Accountability: Designs, Dilemmas and Experiences (Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), 337-342. 
15 See, e.g., Joseph Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and its Virtue’, in The Authority of Law: Essays on 
Law and Morality 2nd ed.  (Oxford University Press, 2009), 210-231.  Compare A.V. Dicey, 
‘The Rule of Law: Its Nature and Application’, in Introduction to the Study of the Law of the 
Constitution 10th ed. (London: Macmillan, 1982 [1885]), 183-205. 
16 See Dowdle, ‘Public Accountability in Alien Terrain’, 332-337; cf. Michael J. Piore and 
Charles F. Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide:  Possibilities for Prosperity (New York: 
Basic Books, 1984), 49-54.  
17 See Mary Ann Glendon, ‘Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions’, University of 
Chicago Law Review 59 (1992): 519–538. 
18 See generally Joseph Tussman and Jacobus tenBroek, ‘The Equal Protection of the Laws’,  
California Law Review 37 (1949): 341-381.  Cf. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 
U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).   
19 See Keith Michael Baker, Inventing the French Revolution:  Essays on French Political 
Culture in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge University Press, 1990), 252-306. 
20 See, e.g., Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790).  See generally 
A.V. Dicey, Lectures on the Relation between Law and Public Opinion in England during the 
Nineteenth Century (ed., Richard VandeWetering) (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008).45-46, 
51-90. 
21 See, e.g., A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1885). 
22 See E.P. Thompson, Makings of the English Working Class rev. ed. (London: Penguin 
Books, 1991), 111-203.  Cf.  Dicey, Lectures, 150-214. 
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often interacted with each other and with the structural-liberal vision, changing and being 
changed as each continually experienced new kinds of concerns (see also below).  
 But after the end of the Second World War, these other visions would be 
significantly overshadowed in Western constitutional consciousness by the liberal-structural 
vision, as American political influence came to dominate the ‘Western’ (American and 
Western European) world as a result of the material and psychological destruction of 
Europe and the political dynamics of the Cold War.  The structural-liberal vision thus 
currently enjoys a virtually hegemonic preeminence in a number of important international 
and geo-political settings: including law and development,23 law and economics,24 human 
rights,25 ‘comparative constitutional law’26 and the ‘global model’ of constitutional rights.27 
But as we shall see, such hegemonic dominance is problematic when applied to 
constitutional situations that differ from those the structural-liberal vision evolved to 
address.  And this counsels strongly that we need to be more aware of the limits of its 
vision, and how they can be overcome. 
 The remainder of this chapter will proceed in three parts.  The second part will 
explore some of the principal blind-spots in the structural-liberal vision.  These include its 
relative disinterest in issues of state-building; its inability to perceive dynamics of 
constitutional evolution; and its inability to account for the interdependences that tie the 
effectiveness of particular constitutional structures to particular environmental factors that 
                                                 
23 See, e.g., Noah Feldman, ‘Imposed Constitutionalism’, Connecticut Law Review 37 (2005): 
857-889. 
24 See, e.g., John Morison, Kieran McEvoy and Gordon Anthony (eds.), Judges, Transition, 
and Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2007). 
25 See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg (ed.), Comparative Constitutional Design (Cambridge University 
Press, 2014). 
26 See Günter Frankenberg, ‘Constitutional Transfer: The IKEA Theory Revisited’, 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 8 (2010): 563-579. 
27 Kai Mollers, The Global Model of Constitutional Rights (Oxford University Press, 2012). 
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lie outside the structural-liberal field of vision. The third part will then explore how the 
structural liberal vision relates to the other European visions of constitutionalism, 
particularly the Rousseauean vision and the radical vision of early-industrial England.  
Finally, Part IV will examine how these limitations might be transcended. 
 
II. THE STRUCTURAL-LIBERAL VISION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND ITS BLIND SPOTS 
 
 
A. State Building 
 
 A constitution plays a significant role in the dynamic process of state building.28 This 
is missed in a vision of constitutionalism that approaches it solely as a program of limiting 
public powers through legal norms. Such a model is incapable of exploring how the 
constitution gains meaningful purchase in an environment in which the driving concern is 
one of creating the apparatus of government and fomenting the idea of the state where it is 
weak or non-existent. A study of the constitution in any context is deficient if it is exhausted 
by a study of positive legal restraints on the use of governmental power; constitutional 
enquiry is as much about the exercise of public power.  
 (There is thus irony in the fact that the US Constitution of 1789 was itself a good 
example of this process of constitutional state-building, given its subsequent influence on 
the structural liberal vision of state-limitation.  As noted by Hannah Arendt, the self-
conception of the American founders speaks in an entirely clear, unambiguous language: 
their question, “was not how to limit power but how to establish it, not how to limit 
government but how to found a new one.”29) 
                                                 
28 See also Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (London: Penguin, 1990), 145. 
29 Id. at 148. 
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 Much of the attention focused on state-building is on the development of 
government regulatory capacity – what Martin Loughlin refers to as ‘governance’ (see also 
Dowdle, this volume).30  However, there is another aspect of state-building that is less well 
recognized, but equally essential to the constitutional project, and equally obscured by the 
structural liberal vision.  This involves the development of a “We the People” – i.e., the state 
as an organic construct rather than simply a collection of rules.  (See, e.g., Wilkinson, this 
volume; John, this volume.) 
 However heterogeneous they be, ‘We the People’ provide the symbolic unity that 
underlies the authority of the modern constitution.31  In modern terms, it is said, “a 
constitution involves the idea of an authority and an author whose willpower is the ultimate 
cause of the polity.”32  But this is a reflexive process. As Sheldon Wolin commented on the 
occasion of the bicentenary of the US constitution: 
[A] constitution not only constitutes a structure of power and authority, it 
constitutes a people in a certain way. It proposes a distinctive identity and envisions 
a form of politicalness for individuals in their new collective capacity.33  
 The true import of the constitutional need to reflect a ‘we the people’ is neatly 
illustrated in the recently failed European Constitutional project, a polity-building exercise 
                                                 
30 Martin Loughlin, Foundations of Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2010), 275-466; 
see especially id. at 407-434. 
31 See Simone Chambers, ‘Democracy, Popular Sovereignty, and Constitutional Legitimacy’, 
Constellations 11 (2004): 153-173. Cf. Hans Lindahl, ‘Sovereignty and Representation in the 
EU’, in Neil Walker (ed.) Sovereignty in Transition (Hart Publishing, 2003), 87-115.  
32 Ulrich K. Preuss, ‘Constitutional Power-Making for the New Polity: Some Deliberations 
on the Relations Between the Constituent Power and the Constitution’, Cardozo Law Review 
14 (1992-1993): 639-660. 
33 Seldon Wolin, The Presence of the Past: Essays on the State and the Constitution (John 
Hopkins Press, 1989), 9.  
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which calculated – in hindsight miscalculated – “the power of the constitutional word”.34 
This project failed – or has failed so far –because there is no distinctly ‘European’ 
constituent political identity to undergird it.35 And as will be demonstrated later in this 
volume, this constitutional failure is a product, at least in significant part, of Europe’s 
unfettered pursuit of a liberal constitutional vision (see Wilkinson, this volume).   
 
B. Change 
 All constitutional systems evolve.  And they often evolve in ways that are not 
foreseen by their founders; or even perceived by their contemporaries.  They even can 
involve in ways that run counter to the intentions of both founders – as was the case with 
Jacksonian Democracy in the United States, for example36 – and current political elites – a 
process that elsewhere has been referred to as ‘runaway legitimation’, and that Tocqueville 
described so well in the context of the French Revolution.37 Indeed, the ability 
spontaneously to adapt to broader environmental changes may be a critical element of 
constitutional survival.   
 But such evolution subtly contradicts the predicates of the liberal-structural model, 
which claims to work by legally assigning and locking-in, in some cases indefinitely, 
particular configurations of state and non-state power.38 Such a scheme presumes an ability 
                                                 
34 See J. H. H. Weiler, ‘On the Power of the Word: Europe’s Constitutional Iconography’, 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 3 (2005): 173-190.  
35 Michael A. Wilkinson, ‘Political Constitutionalism and the European Union’, Modern Law 
Review 76 (2013): 191-222.  
36 See Wood, Radicalization, 347-370. 
37 See Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the Revolution (ed., François Furet and 
Françoise Mélonio) (trans., Alan S. Kahan) (University of Chicago Press, 1998), 230-233, 
241-248; see also Jon Elster, ‘Strategic Uses of Argument’, in Kenneth Arrow et al. (eds.), 
Barriers To Conflict Resolution (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), 250; see generally Michael 
W. Dowdle, ‘Constitutional Listening’, Chicago-Kent Law Review 88 (2012): 121-125. 
38 Sciulli, Theory of Societal Constitutionalism, 9-10. 
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to strategically control state power:  to be able to intentionally disaggregate it, assign it, and 
limit it to some particular constellation of institutional sites.  Constitutional evolution, by 
contrast, involves the release and reconfiguration of state power in ways that exceed the 
reins of strategic intentionality.39  The spontaneous character of this evolution suggests that 
even in the most mature and robust of constitutional systems, public power is able to 
evade, or circumvent the formal constitutional architecture, extending itself in ways that 
bypass initial design constraints.  
 But at the same time, such spontaneous evolution need not be destructive for the 
project of constitution-building. On the contrary, challenge and disruption might be 
necessary in order to ‘destabilize’ dominant but unsustainable constitutional ideas and 
practices, to provoke an internal response to an external noise. 40 Indeed, the hallmark of a 
mature constitutional system might be in structurally recognizing when spontaneous 
circumvention is necessary in order to respond to new imperatives, and in nevertheless 
being able to ensure that this evolution preserves the constitution’s foundational spirit.  
Again, this is problematic for the structural-liberal vision, because that vision regards un-
channeled public power as innately corrupting and dangerous.41  
 Whilst such concerns are often justified, liberalism nevertheless ultimately fails to 
account for the political reality of constitutional survival.  The fact that in all successful 
constitutions, including liberal ones, power always demonstrates capacity to evade strategic 
control, and yet nevertheless often ends up contributing to rather than corrupting the 
                                                 
39 Cf. Colin Scott, ‘Spontaneous Accountability’, in Michael W. Dowdle (ed.), Public 
Accountability: Designs, Dilemmas and Experiences (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 
174-191; Cf. Gunther Teubner, ‘Juridification: Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions’, in 
Robert Baldwin, Colin Scott and Christopher Hood (eds.), A Reader on Regulation (Oxford 
University Press, 1998), 406-414. 
40 See Sciulli, Societal Constitutionalism; Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal 
Studies Movement (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), 23, 31-32. 
41 See, e.g., Holmes, Passions and Constraints.  
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constitutional project, suggests strongly that the liberal constitutionalists blanket fear of 
‘unbridled power’ is too simplistic.  Sometimes, a constitution needs power to free itself at 
least somewhat from its constitutional constraints — for the sake of that constitutionalism’s 
own survival.42 
 The structural-liberal vision of constitutionalism cannot satisfactorily account for the 
phenomena of evolutionary change and revolutionary rupture.  In fact, it effectively 
presumes that our knowledge of the possibilities and impossibilities of constitutionalism and 
its future is already complete, 43 a presumption that David Sciulli has well-termed “the 
fallacy of exhausted possibilities” in American constitutional thought.44  To identify, for 
example, constitutionalism with judicial supremacy leaves no conceptual purchase for 
critical reflection on the possibility that in particular environments there are other ways of 
achieving the ends it is supposed to achieve; and that in at least some of these particular 
environments, these alternative means may represent improvements over the structural-
liberal understanding.45  By linking liberalism to particular institutional structures, and then 
by identifying constitutionalism primarily by their presence, structural-liberalism not only 
fails to explain constitutional evolution, it also fails to leave conceptual room for 
constitutional innovation and idiosyncrasy.46 
 
                                                 
42 Cf. Bruce Ackerman, We the People, vol. 1: Foundations (Cambridge (MA): Belknap 
Press, 1991). 
43 See, e.g., Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1992). 
44 See, e.g., Scuilli. 
45 See Olivier Beaud, ‘Reframing a Debate Among Americans: Contextualising a Moral 
Philosophy of Law’, International Journal of Constitutional Law 7 (2009): 53 - 68.  Cf. 
Michael W. Dowdle, ‘On the Public Law Character of Competition Law: A Lesson from 
Asian Capitalism’, Fordham International Law Journal 38 (2015): 303-305. 
46  See also Michael C. Dorf and Charles F. Sabel, ‘A Constitution of Democratic 
Experimentalism’, Columbia Law Review 98 (1998): 270-291. 
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C. Structural symbiosis 
 The structural-liberal vision treats the constitution as a normatively autonomous 
system.47  It rejects interdependencies with environmental factors that lie outside its 
normative grasp (although within the liberal tradition, there are different understandings of 
what territory is included within that grasp – for example, whether the organization of 
capital – i.e., the ‘variety of capitalism’48 –  is or is not a part of the constitution’s normative 
universe49).  Thus, for example, in the context of American constitutionalism, structural 
liberalism for the most part perceives no normative distinction between the constitution of 
early 19th century, agrarian and pre-industrial America, and that of early 21st century, post-
industrial America—even while it does recognize the immense practical differences 
between those two societies.50   
 But history shows that constitutions are not normatively autonomous.  Their 
prescriptions are continually shaped and reshaped by aspects of their environment that 
elude their own normative or even cognitive grasp (see Teubner, this volume).  For example, 
American understandings of the normative shapes of democracy, rule of law, and 
separation of powers were all fundamentally reconfigured by the rapid on-set of Fordist 
                                                 
47 See Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1986); cf. 
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1971). 
48 See Peter A. Hall and David Soskice (eds.), Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional 
Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford University Press, 2001). 
49 Compare Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1986), chs. 12-13, with Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (University of 
Chicago Press, 1962). 
50 See, e.g., David A.J. Richards, Foundations of American Constitutionalism (Oxford 
University Press, 1989).  Cf. Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (trans., Max Knight) 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 193-223. 
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industrialization (what Alfred Chandler has famously called ‘managerial capitalism’51) during 
the latter third of the 19th century.   
 Structural liberalism has no handle with which to conceptualize this.  Thus, for 
example, the structural-liberal tradition often attributes the collapse of the Weimar 
Republic to its inadequate constitutional institutions, particularly its lack of judicial review.52  
In doing so, however, it ignores the social devastation and corresponding political panic that 
was caused by the onset of the Great Depression.  Could the German judiciary really have 
halted such a panic during such a crisis?  If so, how?  The American Supreme Court Justice 
Sandra Day O’Conner’s observation about the limits of judicial power, even in the United 
States, is worth repeating here: 
 [T]he Court cannot buy support for its decisions by spending money and, except to a 
minor degree, it cannot independently coerce obedience to its decrees.  The Court's 
power lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that 
shows itself in the people's acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the 
nation's law means and to declare what it demands.53 
 A polity in significant material need or existential insecurity will not put much stock 
in the value of the abstract norms articulated by a remote judge.54  They will not put as 
much value in the abstract norms articulated by a constitution regardless of whether they 
                                                 
51 Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., ‘The Emergence of Managerial Capitalism’, The Business History 
Review 58 (1984): 473-503 
52 See Christoph Mollers, ‘The Scope and Legitimacy of Judicial Review in German 
Constitutional Law: Report on a Missing Debate’, in Hermann Punder and Christian 
Waldhoff (eds.), Debates in German Public Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014).  
53 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992). 
54 Cf. Ronald Inglehart and Daphna Oyserman, ‘Individualism, Autonomy and Self-
Expression: The Human Development Syndrome’, in Henk Vinken, Joseph Soeters and Peter 
Ester (eds.), Comparing Cultures, Dimensions of Culture in a Comparative Perspective 
(Leiden: Brill,  2004), 74-96. 
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should or not.55  Weimar Germany was not the only European country threatened by 
constitutional collapse in the 1930s.56 England was vulnerable too.57  The English 
constitutional system survived of course (the Great Depression was not as brutal there as it 
was in Germany).  But at the same time, it was also able to do so without judicial review.  
Structural liberalism has no explanation for how it was able to do so, when Germany could 
not. 
 When considerations of systemic symbiosis are brought fully into perspective, the 
liberal-structural model can seem distorting and even dysfunctional.  By obscuring systemic 
interdependencies, the liberal vision shines a far too narrow light on the range of difficulties 
that can effect constitutional survival.58  Similarly, it also threatens to misconstrue, by 
obscuring and mislabeling as ersatz, constitutional structures and dynamics that diverge 
from those in the structural liberal pantheon, but which nevertheless may be more 
promising and/or appropriate in light of that particular constitutional system’s larger social 
environment (see especially Dowdle, this volume).59  
 Another example involves the relationship between the constitution and the socio-
economic-industrial structure of the polity, an issue that has recently been revitalized in the 
                                                 
55 See Harold James, ‘Economic Reasons for the Collapse of the Weimar Republic’, in Ian 
Kershaw (ed.), Weimar: Why Did German Democracy Fail? (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1990), 30–57; see also John Maynard Keynes, ‘A Short View of Russia’, in The Collected 
Writings of John Maynard Keynes, vol. 9 (London: Macmillan, 1971), 253. 
56 See Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century 17-27 (London: 
Penguin, 1999); Fritz Stern, ‘The New Democracies in Crisis in Interwar Europe’, in Axel 
Hadenius (ed.), Democracy’s Victory and Crisis (Cambridge University Press, 1997), 15. 
57 See Mazower, Dark Continent, XX; see, e.g., Keynes, ‘A Short View of Russia’. 
58 See Pasuk Phongpaicht and Chris Baker, Thailand’s Crisis (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2000), 35-82; Asli U. Bali, ‘Justice Under Occupation: Rule of Law 
and the Ethics of Nation-Building in Iraq’, Yale Journal of International Law 30 (2005): 431-
472. 
59 See Phongpaicht and Baker, Thailand’s Crisis, 97-104; see also, e.g., John Braithwaite, 
Valerie Braithwaite, Michael Cookson and Leah Dunn, Anomie and Violence:  Non-truth and 
Reconciliation in Indonesian Peacebuilding (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2010); cf. Dorf and 
Sabel, ‘A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism’, 270-291. 
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wake of the Global Financial Crisis.60 Structural-liberalism’s inability to visualize the 
constitution’s interdependence with its surrounding social environment can lend it to 
induce dysfunctional economic biases into its normative prescriptions.  Structural-liberalism 
tends to conflate the material constitution (i.e., the way a constitution should distribute 
wealth and resources within its polity) with what we might call the constitution of liberty 
(i.e., the way a constitution should distribute ‘liberty’, and especially negative liberty, within 
its polity) (a conflation that sometimes referred to as ‘Manchester liberalism’).61  This causes 
structural-liberalism to privilege demands for procedural or formal equality over demands 
for material equality; and that, in turn, causes it generally to privilege demands for 
economic (neo-)liberalism over demands for social democracy (see also Wilkinson, this 
volume).62  But as has been re-emphasized since the Global Financial Crisis, material 
equality is an equally important factor for constitutional success: issues of material equality 
cannot be compensated for simply by promoting greater procedural (formal) equality.63 
 
III. INTERLOCKING VISIONS 
 
 
 As described in the introduction to this chapter, other visions of constitutionalism 
exist – each, like the structural-liberal vision, adapted to address a particular set of concerns 
and problems, which have their own non-parochial relevance.  In France, the Jacobins – 
                                                 
60 See e.g. Gunther Teubner, Financial Crisis in Constitutional Perspective: The Dark Side of 
Functional Differentiation (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011). 
61 See Peter Evans, ‘Collective Capabilities, Culture, and Amartya Sen’s Development as 
Freedom’, Studies in Comparative International Development 37 (2002): 54-60. 
62 Compare Ronald Dworkin, ‘What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare’, Philosophy 
and Public Affairs 10 (1981): 185-246, with Ronald Dworkin, ‘What is Equality? Part 2: 
Equality of Resources’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (1981): 283-345. 
63 See also Michael W. Dowdle, ‘On the Public-Law Character of Competition Law: A 
Lesson from Asian Capitalism’, Fordham International Law Journal 38 (2015): 355-357; cf. 
Michael I. Norton, ‘Unequality: Who Gets What and Why It Matters’, Policy Insights from 
the Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (2014): 151-155.   
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inspired by Rousseau – developed a vision of constitutionalism that celebrated le pouvoir 
constituent (see Goldoni, this volume). In England, Jacobinism fed into a long-standing 
‘radical’ vision of constitutionalism, which dates back to the Leveller movement of the mid-
17th century, 64 catalyzing the emergence of the early-industrial radical movement of the 
late 18th and early 19th century.65 At the same time, both this radical movement and the 
associated Jacobin vision gave rise to two distinct English counter reactions, both reflecting 
a profound distrust of the masses.  These include the intellectual tradition of ‘Whiggish’ 
constitutionalism, as best represented by A.V. Dicey, founded on a vision of parliamentary 
sovereignty and an uncodified but principled ‘rule of law’;66 and a more organic and 
conservative vision, called the ‘Tory Constitution’ by Dicey and exemplified by Edmund 
Burke, which presented the constitution through the lens of a privileged national historical 
teleology.67  
 Like the liberal structural vision of constitutionalism, these other constitutional 
visions emerge from particular historical trajectories: a need to constitutionalize the status 
of the aristocracy in the case of the conservative, ‘Tory’ constitution;68 the extreme social 
and economic disruptions of industrialization in the case of England’s radical 
constitutionalism; emancipation of the third estate from feudal repression in the case of the 
                                                 
64 See e.g. M. Loughlin, ‘Constituent Power Subverted: From English Constitutional 
Argument to British Constitutional Practice’ in Martin Loughlin and Neil Walker (eds.), The 
Paradox of Constitutionalism (Oxford University Press, 2007): 27 – 49.  
65 See Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, 111-203. 
66 See generally Matthew Zagor, ‘England and the Rediscovery of Constitutional Faith’, 
ANU College of Law Working Paper (Canberra: Australian National University, July 30, 
2009).  
67 See, e.g., Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790); Cf. Dicey, 
Lectures, 51-60. 
68 See, e.g., Burke, Reflections. 
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French Jacobin model;69 and the projection of nationalism and imperialism in the case of 
Dicey’s Whiggish model.  
 Nor were these visions hermetically sealed.  Thus, for example, the American 
structural-liberal vision was itself strongly inspired by the English Tory constitution, 
particularly as reflected through the writings of Montesquieu.70  American constitutional 
thought would then be (re-)introduced into post-Revolutionary France and radical England 
via the work of Thomas Paine.71  (The Jacobian vision of constitution was to some extent an 
express rejection of the American vision, which was too authoritarian.)  Both Paine and the 
Jacobin constitutionalism would, as we saw, be germinal inspirations for the radical 
constitutionalism of the early industrial English working class.72   
 During the 19th century, England’s Whiggish and Tory constitutionalisms, as we also 
saw, were driven to considerable extent by a fear of French constitutionalism.  As the 
commercial and agrarian classes in the early 19th century United States became increasingly 
dissatisfied by American constitutionalism’s innately aristocratic roots (which it inherited 
from its Tory influences),73 they were inspired in part by the experiences of the late 18th 
century English radicals74 — a process that ultimately culminated in the establishment of 
Jacksonian Democracy.75  The American structural-liberal vision, and in particular its way of 
                                                 
69 See Simon Schama, Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution new ed. (London: 
Penguin, 2004). 
70 See William D. Liddle, ‘“A Patriot King, or None”: Lord Bolingbroke and the American 
Renunciation of George III,’ The Journal of American History 65 (1979): 951-970; Gordon 
S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill [NC]: University 
of North Carolina Press 1998), 150-161. 
71 See Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, 93-113; Schama, Citizens, xx 
72 See generally Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, 111-205. 
73 See Wood, American Radicalism, xx. 
74 See Jason Frank, Constituent Moments: Enacting the People in Postrevolutionary America 
(Durhan [NC]: Duke University Press, 2010). 
75 Wood, American Radicalism, xx. 
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regulating democracy, were influential on Dicey.76  Towards the end of the 19th century, the 
work of the English constitutional scholar Walter Bagehot would itself inspire the 
constitutional understandings of a Princeton Professor of Political Science named Woodrow 
Wilson, who would later become the twenty-eighth President of the United States.77 
 The revolutionary, Jacobin model that emerged in late 18th century France may itself 
have been short-lived – as Hannah Arendt put it, a model “built on quicksand”. 78 But the 
constitutional ideas of its principal source of inspiration, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, would be 
particularly influential in popularizing the idea of constitutionalism beyond the North 
Atlantic.  His influence would be felt in the diffusion of constitutional discourse into the 
‘Tazimat’ constitutionalization of the Ottoman Empire, the Persian Constitutional Revolution 
of 1906, the constitutionalization of Japan during the Meiji restoration, and efforts at 
constitutionalization in post-imperial China.79 
 And new conceptual strands continued to be added to this interweaving during the 
19th and 20th centuries.  During the 19th century, these would include, for example, the 
Prussian Historical School, successors to the German camaralists and, through Max Weber, 
the intellectual discoverers of rational-bureaucratic modernity.80  The constitutional 
                                                 
76 See Michael Kamman, A Machine that Would Go of Itself: The Constitution in American 
Culture (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986). 
77 See Ray S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters, Youth, 1856-1890 (Westport [CT]: 
Greenwood Press, 1968), 213-214. 
78 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (London: Penguin, 2006 [1958]), 163. 
79 See George Akita, Foundations of Constitutional Government in Modern Japan, 1868-
1900 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967) (Japan); Robert Devereux, The First 
Ottoman Constitutional Period:  A Study of the Midhat Constitution and Parliament 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963) (Ottoman Empire); Abdul-Hadi 
Hairi, ‘European and Asian Influences on the Persian Revolution of 1906’, Asian Affairs 6 
(1975): 155-164 (Persia); Leigh K. Jenco, Making the Political: Founding and Action in the 
Political Theory of Zhang Shizhao (Cambridge University Press, 2010) (China). 
80 See Keith Tribe, Strategies of Economic Order:  German Economic Discourse 1750-1950 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
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development of what has been called ‘infrastructural power’,81 combined with the liberal 
constitutional vision, results in a constitutional construction that today is called the 
regulatory state.82  The later part of the 19th century would also see the emergence of 
Catholic corporatism (or corporativism), which would eventually morph, first into Italian 
Fascism, but eventually and more positively into the (neo-)corporatist welfare states of 
Christian democratic Europe.83 
 The 20th century would see not simply the continued expansion of constitutionalist 
conceptualisations, but the growing introduction to this discourse of non-Anglo-European 
experiences.  These include the incorporation of Islamic strands (see also Lombardi, this 
volume),84 neo-Confucian strands,85 developmentalist strands,86 and Chinese and Asian 
‘state-capitalist’ strands.87   
                                                 
81 See Michael Mann, ‘The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and 
Results’, European Journal of Sociology 25 (1984): 188-194. 
82 See Tony Prosser, ‘Models of Economic and Social Regulation’, in Dawn Oliver, Tony 
Prosser and Richard Rawlings (eds.), The Regulatory State: Constitutional Implications 
(Oxford University Press, 2010), 34-49.  Compare Bernard S. Silberman, Cages of Reason: 
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(University of Chicago Press, 1993), 250-286. 
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Political Future (eds., Daniel A. Bell and Ruiping Fan; transl., Edmund Ryden) (Princeton 
University Press, 2012). 
86 See Kanishka Jayasuriya, ‘Introduction: A Framework for the Analysis of Legal 
Institutions in East Asia’, in Kanishka Jayasuriya (ed.), Law, Capitalism and Power  
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in a Post-Fordist World’, in Leigh K. Jenco (ed.), Chinese Thought as Global Theory: 
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 Constitutionalism is thus a complex, uneven and ever-changing historical discourse – 
it is ‘bricolage’ rather than blueprint, ‘layered narrative’ rather than grand narrative.88  The 
structural-liberal vision is a significant voice in this discourse.  And for all that, a holistic 
understanding is necessary.  The realization of constitutionalism is pluralist and diverse:  no 
single perspective is able to capture its full possibilities as a political phenomenon; each has 
its own particular wisdom and folly.  It is in their consilience that insights might be found 
into new possibilities for the constitutional project.89 
 A subtext of this narrative of interlocking narratives is that there is no linear, 
universal path of constitutional progression. Ideas return that were formerly consigned to 
the history books. And those that persist throughout do not remain in pristine condition. 
‘Popular constitutionalism’, for example, has been revived in recent years in the form of a 
much narrower position in US constitutional debates over the final arbiter of constitutional 
interpretation, defending a position that rejects strict judicial supremacy.90 A distinct but 
not unrelated vision of ‘civic republicanism’, with its focus on political equality and the 
                                                                                                                                                        
SUNY Press, 2016 (in press)); see also Dowdle, ‘Constitutional Listening’, 142-156.  Cf. Li-
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Towards a Layered Narrative’, International Journal of Constitutional Law 4 (2006): 439-
459. 
89 Cf. Edward O. Wilson, Consilience:  The Unity of Knowledge (New York, Alfred A. 
Knopf. 1998). 
90 Compare Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and 
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status of the citizen,91 have ‘rediscovered’ the older, classic Republicanism of the early-
modern era.92  
 In UK public law scholarship, a ‘political’ – sometimes labeled ‘republican’ – 
constitutionalism has re-emerged, attempting to reclaim the broader concept of the 
constitution as meaning the strength and health of the body politic, a concept that has been 
erased from view in the modernizing processes of constitutional reform and liberal 
discourses of fundamental rights.93  But it, too, did not emerge in isolation, but as a 
dialogical response to the ‘legal constitutionalism’ of the structural-liberal vision94, and in 
particular in the need to question that vision’s presumption of the presence of an 
overarching rational consensus among the polity that supposedly allows for the 
judicialisation of political process and juridification of social relationships.95 
 Thus, constitutionalism has always been both a cosmopolitan and a pluralist idea. As 
Neil Walker has noted, “the humanist gene in the idea of popular sovereignty” means that 
even “the most introverted, culturally monolithic and exclusionary national ideology will 
develop certain universalist themes.”96  At the same time, and despite the universalism of 
constitutional thought, constitutional discourse always has to acknowledge its rootedness in 
a particular polity, to acknowledge some spatial boundary and limit:  “even the most 
                                                 
91 See generally Iseult Honohan, Civic Republicanism (London: Routledge, 2002).  See, e.g., 
Philip Pettit, Republicanism (Oxford University Press, 1997); Quentin Skinner, Liberty 
before Liberalism (Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
92 Philip Pettit, “Two Republican Traditions,” in Andreas Niederberger and Philipp Schink 
(eds.), Republican Democracy: Liberty, Law and Politics (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
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93 See e.g. Adam Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005); cf. 
Gregoire Webber and Grahame Gee, ‘What is a Political Constitution?’, Oxford Journal of 
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avowedly universalist framework of self-government must draw from and reinvest in its 
own particular experience.”97 Whatever ideological commitments it makes towards a moral 
universalism based on the individual, the constitution is always constructed in a specific 
social setting with a specific political morality and contributes towards the building of a 
particular state or polity. But this polity is not a given, it is in turn shaped by the particular 
ideals that inform that state’s constitutional development, those that resonate somewhat 
uniquely in their particular political community and forge (or fail to forge) social solidarity 
amongst its members.  (See also Wilkinson, this volume.) 
 Seen in this light, modern constitutionalism is ultimately a balancing act, informed by 
an incredible diversity of constitutional experiences, but nevertheless uniquely attached to 
its political circumstances.98  The problem with liberalism here is thus two fold.  On the one 
hand, it obscures the diversity of sources from which a ‘living’ constitutional tradition can be 
constructed.  On the other hand, its own inherent universalism leaves a polity no room or 
reason for feeling any special attachment to its own particular constitutional order.  Given 
the (generally unacknowledged) evolutions in structural liberalism described above, this 
threatens to reduce constitutionalism simply to a political-cosmopolitan zeitgeist, as when 
the European Union constitutionalisation process is considered “an important stage along 
the route to a politically constituted world society,”99 despite its evident fragmentation and 
conflict. In order for constitutionalism to continue to develop its myriad possibilities, its 
diversity of experiences and visions must be recognized, and critically scrutinised.  How we 
might do this is the subject of the next and final part to this chapter.   
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IV. LOOKING BEYOND LIBERALISM  
 
 As noted in the introduction, the lesson in all this is that we need to expand our 
constitutional imagination in ways that allow us to look beyond liberalism — not rejecting 
liberalism per se, but realizing its limitations and developing conceptual tools that can help 
us transcend them. 
 Some argue that such cosmopolitan, cross-cultural explorations of ‘law’ – including 
constitutional law – is impossible.100 The complexities of cultural diversity – the differences 
in languages, cultural metaphors, social meanings, social experiences – render any attempt 
at cross-cultural normative or conceptual synthesis ultimately futile.  There are at least two 
responses to this kind of skepticism.   
 The first is methodological. Even if it is true that we can never really know if we 
accurately understand another culture (or even another individual), it doesn’t matter: we 
can never really know if we can’t understand another culture (or person) either.  Both 
positions start from a presumption of either ultimate incomprehensibility or ultimate 
comprehensibly.  There is no reason for preferring one to the other.  For that reason, we 
have at least as much justification for pursuing the possibilities inherent in comprehensibly 
as we do for presuming that such pursuits will be in vain. 
 The second response to the skeptical assertion is empirical.  It is not hard to find 
demonstration of complex cooperation across cultures, cooperation that simply could not 
work if cross-cultural understanding were impossible — e.g., cross-cultural marriages, cross-
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cultural friendships, cross-cultural business partnerships, even cross-culture academic 
conferences.  The prevalence of successful endeavors of this sort argues strongly – we 
would say conclusively – that cross-cultural communication, understanding and consilience 
are eminently possible and feasible.  This conclusion is supported by a large number of 
psychological studies.  Meta-studies of the cultural psychology studies find that both 
perceptions of experience and modes of making sense of those perceptions (e.g., 
rationalism, sentimentalism, folk knowledge) in fact do not differ significantly across 
cultures: that both perception and cognition (reason) are human and not cultural 
phenomena.101 What differs among cultures is the way perception and cognition are 
expressed – i.e., the symbols and metaphors that we use to locate particular perceptions 
and cognitions into our larger understanding of the world.102  The key to our exploration 
therefore lies in looking beyond expressions and metaphors, and at the rationality and 
coherence that underlies the statement.   
 Along these lines, a good starting point for looking ‘beyond liberalism’ is the 
interpretive principle that Donald Davidson famously called “the principle of charity.” 103  
The principle of charity starts from the observation that the best heuristic for determining 
the meaning of a particular statement is to assume that the speaker is ‘making sense’ – i.e., 
to privilege interpretations that maximize the coherence and meaning of the statement.  
This involves, for example, presuming that the speaker is rational, presuming that she is not 
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intending to be normatively deceptive (although she might be wrong on particular factual 
matters), and that she is trying to be persuasive to her particular audience.104   
 The comparative advantage of the principle of charity is not that it gives the most 
accurate understanding of the intentions of the speaker.  It is not to help us understand why 
somebody said what she did; or if or how that statement benefits her interests.  Its purpose 
is to maximize our ability to learn from the speaker’s statement.  Consistent with this 
approach, this volume demonstrates how listening to alternative constitutional experiences 
using a principle of charity allows us to better perceive and account for the limits of 
liberalism, and at the same time to defend the cosmopolitan vitality of the constitutional 
project. 
 At the same time, the principle of charity demands that this listening be reflexive 
rather than passive.  Reflexivity, as Neil Walker notes, “amounts to more than providing a 
reflection. . . . Rather it is about the quality of ipseity – of the capacity for self-reflection and 
the possibility of self-transformation inherent in that capacity.”105 This reflexivity is more 
demanding than the orthodox liberal approach permits.  First, it is holistic in the sense of 
perceiving the ‘other’ polity – not as an institutionally-defined corpus (e.g., as an electorate, 
or as a civil society, or as a set of survey data) comprised of atomistically autonomous 
individual beings – but as an organic inter-linkage of an ‘ideational’ telos with a ‘structural’ 
nomos (again, see Teubner, this volume): it is both population and community, both 
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constituted and constituting.106  It is both abstract structure, and “the living individuality of 
a nation.”107  
 Second, rather than see the constitution as the product of an instance of 
transcendental moment of pure reason, where the ‘house’ wherein political freedom can 
dwell is constructed in one go, this reflexivity recognizes that the constitution is an on-going 
narrative constantly interweaving a diversity of perspectives, concerns, and imaginations.  
Relatedly, rather than seeing the constitution in terms of a dualist structure in which 
meaningful constitutional discoveries only occur during certain extraordinary and 
punctuated moments of political sobriety, so as to avoid sliding into political excess during 
the otherwise normal state of political drunkenness,108 reflexivity sees the constitution as 
constantly negotiated and renegotiated in the public realm (and soberly, as per the principle 
of charity).109  It thus constantly reminds us, as discussed above, how a “constitution” is 
always a perpetually, spontaneously, and even invisibly evolving work in progress. 
 Thirdly, in order to capture the constitution’s structural symbiosis with other social 
systems in its regulatory environment, this reflexivity must recognize law, politics, and 
society to be dynamically interrelated in the constitutional evolution of the polity (see also 
Teubner, this volume). Of course this interrelationship is not necessarily functional, stable, 
and/or otherwise constructive. There are no constitutional guarantees for the flourishing or 
even survival of the polity. Insobriety occurs. Constitutional reflexivity is a method with 
which to analyze the various tensions that both are latent in the pluralist nature of the 
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constitutional project and necessary for its evolutionary survival.  These tensions are 
sometimes productive, sometimes destructive.  But in either case, they define the focus of 
‘constitutional’ — both insofar as an individual polity is concerned, and insofar as our more 
cosmopolitan understandings are concerned.  
Along these lines, reflexivity requires us to not privilege or essentialize legal 
judgment and judicial interpretation as the principle sources of a normative constitutional 
order.  Such a presumption is both under inclusive and over inclusive.  On the one hand, 
while these are significant components of that order, they must not be confused for its 
whole. Whether and how a legal judgment is translated into action depends on the degree 
to which a political culture and background social order has internalised a relatively high 
level of obedience to the law and at least official acceptance of the rules of law-making.110  
At the same time, the rules of law-making are frequently complex and under-determined.  
This makes the Court an active participant in the balance of constitutional powers — in the 
language of speech-act theory, it makes judicial judgements ‘performative’ and not simply 
‘constative’.111 They are not merely logical or tautologous propositions, but acquire 
recognition and meaning only through broader constitutional practice.  In short, the 
constitutional effects of a Court’s judgment will depend upon the constitutional context in 
which it is uttered.  
 This symbiosis is largely concealed in the liberal-structural tradition, where the 
‘balance of powers’ –or in classic public law, their ‘separation’ – has been established over 
years, perhaps centuries, of conflict and negotiation, and has thus attained what appears to 
be some kind of stable constitutional equilibrium. Juridical authority thenceforth appears a 
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distinct and autonomous constitutional phenomenon — at least in the abstract analysis of 
legal scholars concerned with presenting a snapshot of the constitutional order, or what has 
revealingly been called a ‘momentary legal system’.112  But this appearance is deceptive, 
because in constitutional practice juridical authority is one player in a larger game. 
Lastly, reflexivity also problematizes the constitutional nomos.  Structural liberalism 
conceptualizes the constitutional nomos largely if not exclusively in terms of positive law.  
The canonical structures that constitute the structural-liberal vision are defined legally.  
Because reflexive constitutionalism is more sensitive to constitutional change and to the 
diversity of normative influences that comprise the constitutional arena, it allows for 
practices of constitutional nomoi to take a wider varieties of political and legal forms.  They 
can take the form of pre-theoretical practices.113  They can take the form of particular 
narratives, including fictional or false narratives.114 They can even take the form of a 
particular homeostatic political balance that emerges out of the perpetual clashes among 
the many irresolvable contradictions and conflicts that course through the social and 
political corpus of the nation (see, e.g., Harding, this volume).  Even transparently 
duplicitous claims can develop an normative force of their own, a dynamic that that results 
in part from the innate political need to be seen to be keeping one’s word. 115 
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 Also along these lines, reflexive constitutionalism does not privilege any particular 
conception of the telos, of the public or political good.116  It recognizes that like 
constitutionalism itself, conceptions of what constitutes the public good are also pluralist 
and reflect different experiences, and traumas.  Each perspective has value that transcends 
its instantiation; each is limited in its imagination.  Reflexive constitutionalism attempts to 
expose what is otherwise concealed in debates over the relationship between the 
constitution, the polity and the public good.  It does not offer to determine which 
institutional arrangements produce optimal outcomes, let alone to offer a constitutional 
blueprint for the future. Reflexivity is urged to contribute to a distinct and deeper enquiry 
into the nature of the constitution as an ongoing exercise of collective self-commitment.  
 
                                                 
116 See also Loughlin, Foundations, 159 
